Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy in the Western Balkans by Sabaj, Ernil
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy in the
Western Balkans
Ernil Sabaj
University of Exeter
7 February 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84279/
MPRA Paper No. 84279, posted 8 February 2018 10:47 UTC
Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy in the Western Balkans 
 
Ernil Sabaj1 
 
Abstract2 
 
This paper studies the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in the Western Balkans region, investigating 
empirically the fiscal policy response to business cycles for the period 2003-2016. Although there is a 
large empirical literature which has found that fiscal policy in developing countries is pro-cyclical, not 
many studies are found on the Western Balkans region, with only a few done at country level. We apply 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and other filters to measure the potential output and output gap for each of 
the respective Western Balkans countries. By performing country regressions we find that one of the main 
determinants fiscal pro-cyclicality in the WB6 region is the quality of the government. We conduct a 
series of structural vector auto-regressions (SVAR) for each of the countries in an attempt to obtain further 
evidence on the reaction of fiscal policy to the business cycle. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely known from the Keynesian view that fiscal policy is usually a tool for dealing with output 
fluctuations, but growing literature is shown ambiguous results. In the last decade studies have shown that 
for developing countries fiscal policy behavior has been mainly pro-cyclical. A pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
from Keynesian view and also from the neo-classical view is suboptimal, therefore not desired. Frankel et 
al. (2013) brings empirical evidence that many developing countries are graduating, so passing the school 
of using pro-cyclical policies. After the 2009 crisis the focus on using fiscal policy has come back and 
better understanding of its effect especially in times of crisis are needed. The purpose of this paper is to 
study if the Western Balkans, have graduated from the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy using different 
approaches. Additionally, we intent to measure the impacts in the fiscal behavior rising from different 
structural shocks the economies of the Western Balkans might suffer, including output temporary crisis. 
The paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section 2 gives a briefly overview of the 
main papers, that have dealt with the cyclicality of fiscal policy, worldwide, and also in the western 
Balkans, showing some of their results. Section 3 deals with the methodological aspects of this paper, and 
with the data description. Here, we describe our methods for measuring fiscal policy cyclicality, 
calculating the output gap and the cyclical adjusted balance, giving an overview of the filtering techniques 
used and we explain the VAR methodology for seeing the effects of structural shocks. In Section 4, 
discusses our empirical results for dealing with fiscal policy cyclicality. Section 5 presents concluding 
remarks, while the Appendix shows extensive figures measured from our empirical analysis. 
2. Literature review 
The traditional Keynesian view argues that fiscal policy usually should be counter-cyclical and should 
be a tool used to reduce the effects of the business cycle. Gavin and Perroti (1997) were among the first to 
notice that this was not always the case. They saw for Latino America a phenomenon called pro-
cyclicality, where fiscal policy was expansionary in good time and vice-versa. Later in 2004, one of the 
most influential papers over cyclicality came out from Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), were they 
stated, that pro-cyclicality is present in many developing countries, while counter-cyclicality happened 
more in advanced economies. Lane (2003), checking evidence from the OECD countries provides results 
that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies. Similar results were also confirmed by Alesina and Tabellini (2005), where they give 
arguments that pro-cyclicality is influenced mostly by political distortions. Talvi and Vegh (2005), notice 
that while fiscal policy in the G7 countries appears to follow Barro’s optimal smoothing rules, fiscal 
policy in developing countries is highly pro-cyclical. They explain pro-cyclicality due to the credit 
borrowing constraints that are a common issue this countries face in times of crisis. Woo (2009), associate 
the problem of pro-cyclicality with the polarization of preferences related to social inequality. Aghion and 
Marinescu (2007), say that the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy has increased over time, though 
additional studies are needed in middle income countries. Frankel et al.(2013) show that a third of the 
developing world has been able to escape the pro-cyclicality trap and actually become counter-cyclical, 
but still this has been depending on having stronger institutions. Garneiro and Garrido (2015) confirms the 
findings of Frankel et al. (2013), and of earlier findings in the literature, where they show that developing 
countries have a tendency to behave in a way that contributes to exacerbating the effects of the business 
cycle; tending to exhibit more often than industrialized economies pro-cyclical fiscal policies in both 
booms and downturns, contributing to exacerbate output volatility.  
A few studies on the issue of fiscal policy cyclicality were also found about the western Balkans. 
Kabashi (2016) investigating the cyclical character of fiscal policy in transition countries, also of WB6, in 
the period from 1995 to 2011, using system GMM as the preferred estimation method, finds that  
discretionary policy in the Western Balkan countries has been pro-cyclical, thus aggravating economic 
fluctuations. Staehr (2008) finds that fiscal policy in the SEE EU member states is more countercyclical 
than in the Western European countries. Bezovska et al. (2011), in investigating the cyclical behavior of 
fiscal policy in the Republic of Macedonia during the period of transition, imply that the fiscal policy 
behavior prior to 1996 was pro-cyclical, whereas afterwards the fiscal policy became countercyclical. 
Gazidede (2013), in estimating the fiscal position of Albania through the Cyclically-Adjusted Budget 
Balance, finds that in the case of Albania fiscal policy shows pro-cyclical behavior during the years 2006, 
2008, 2009, 2012, while in the years 2007 and 2010 the nature of fiscal policy is more counter-cyclical. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Measuring Fiscal Cyclicality 
Halland and Bleaney (2009) say that there is no consensus on how to measure fiscal cyclicality. The 
methods may start from measuring the correlation between the cyclical component of output with the 
fiscal variable as used also in Kaminsky et al. (2004), or move to regression-based measures between the 
fiscal variable and the output gap or cyclical component of output. Following a similar method as Aghion 
and Marinescu (2007), we estimate the following equation for each country i: 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
=  𝑐1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + ɛ𝑖 , where ɛ𝑖~ N(0,𝜎ɛ
2) (1) 
Where 𝑐2𝑖𝑡 measures the cyclicality of fiscal policy and a positive sign of it means that the budget surplus 
increases (so the difference 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 becomes more positive) when the economy is in 
expansion, so the fiscal policy is countercyclical and vice-versa when the sign in front of 𝑐2𝑖𝑡 is negative. 
The variables in equation (1) are defined as follows: 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 are the total revenues of the budget for 
each of the countries, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 are the total expenditures of the budget for each of the countries, 
their difference when is positive shows a budget surplus and when negative it shows a budget deficit. In 
order to assess the quality of government impact on the fiscal balance and on fiscal cyclicality we have 
decided to experiment and see the effects by including two variables as proxy-s for government quality, 
the control for corruption and government effectiveness.  
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
=  𝑐1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡  +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  ɛ𝑖 , (2) 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
=  𝑐1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡  + 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  ɛ𝑖 ,(3) 
Since both variables might be highly correlated with each other they are not included together, rather one 
by one. 
3.2. Calculating the Output gap and Cyclical Balance 
The Output gap is computed as: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
) ∗ 100  (4) 
An increasing 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 shows an economic situation of expansion while a negative one, a situation 
of recession. The real issue when calculating the output gap is the estimation of the Potential GDP. As 
suggested by De Jong and Sakarya (2013) some of the most used techniques are the filtering or the 
statistical smoothing conducted in a series, separating the trend from the cycle. In our estimation we will 
use the filters of Hodrick-Prescott (HP)3 (Hodrick and Prescott (1997)); the Baxter – King filter (Baxter 
and King (1995)); the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter (Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003); Butterworth filter 
(Butterworth, 1930); and Corbae-Ouliarisfilter (Corbae and Ouliaris (2006)). The Hodrick-Prescott Filter 
is used among macroeconomists to obtain a smooth estimate of the long-term trend component of a 
series 𝑌𝑡 .The series may be decomposed into a trend or growth component 𝑔𝑡  and a cyclical 
component𝑐𝑡 .The Hodrick–Prescott filter effects such a decomposition by minimizing the following 
equation: 
                                                          
3In our case we will use a parameter of ⅄ = 1600 as usually suggested for quarterly data. 
∑ (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡)
2 +   ⅄ ∑ ((𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑔𝑡  ) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1))
2𝑇−1
𝑡=2
𝑇
𝑡=1  (5) 
The Baxter-King filter suppresses both the low and the high frequency components in a series 𝑌𝑡 which 
has the following representation: 𝑌𝑡 =  ∫ 𝑒
𝑖𝜔𝑑𝑍(𝜔)
𝜋
−𝜋
 (6) and from 𝑌𝑡  it extracts the component by 
applying a bandpass filter 𝑐𝑡
∗ =  ∫ 𝐹∗(𝜔)𝑒𝑖𝜔𝑑𝑍(𝜔)
𝜋
−𝜋
 (7) 
The Butterworth filter (Butterworth, 1930) as explained also by Pollock (1999) is an 
approximation to an “ideal” square-wave filter. It divides the spectrum of a time series into a pass-band 
and a stop-band; where the gain is 1 for the pass-band and 0 for the stop-band. The Christiano-Fitzgerald 
filter as explained by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), identify one approximation which is optimal when 
the series is a random walk and it minimizes the means squared error between the true series and the 
estimated one. The Corbae-Ouliaris filter, according to Corbae and Ouliaris (2006), overcomes some of 
the shortcomings of the HP and Baxter-King filter therefore it might be useful as an alternative method. 
The issue with potential output filter estimations is that sometimes the results for different technical 
aspects might often be ambiguous and contradictory with the perception that economic experts might have 
over the potential of an certain economy. Therefore the choosing of the filter is also up to the expert using 
them upon story convenience. 
Returning to the fiscal balance cyclicality, today many governments for transparency and for a 
better representation of the fiscal position of the country are widely presenting in their balance sheets also 
the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance. In our case we will calculate the Western Balkans countries fiscal 
balances off cyclicality using the Huidromet al. (2016) approach where the cyclical balance is given as: 
Cyclical balance = revenues*(1 + 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝)−1 − expenditures*(1 + 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝)0.1 (8) 
Where it has been assumed an output gap elasticity of 14 for revenues and an elasticity close to zero for 
expenditures. 
 
3.3. Fiscal Deficit effects rising from shocks in output 
We use Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) models to measure the effects of the business cycle 
on the fiscal policy. The SVAR model sheds light on the relationship between the output gap and the fiscal 
deficit and how this relationship affects later the fiscal deficit. As noticed also in Huidromet al. (2016), the 
                                                          
4 Usually revenues are thought of being affected mostly by the business cycle, while expenditures almost 
not at all. 
SVAR model isolates the responses of fiscal policy 5  to exogenous shocks to the macroeconomy. 
Blanchard and Perroti (2002), via a recursive identification scheme identifies the shocks to fiscal policy 
and economic activity. Foolowing a similar approach, starting it from a basic VAR specification we would 
have:𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝐴(𝐿)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡, 𝐸{𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡
′} =  ∑ 𝑒 (9), where y contains n variables and p lags in the VAR. 
In our case we will have only two variables,the fiscal deficit and the output gap, therefore our equation 
would look like in a matrix form: 
⌈
1 𝑎12
𝑎21 1
⌉ ⌈
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡
⌉ = ⌈
𝑏10
𝑏20
⌉ +  ⌈
𝑏11 𝑏12
𝑏21 𝑏22
⌉ ⌈
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡−1
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡−1
⌉ +  ⌈
𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡,𝑡   
𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑡   
⌉ (10) 
where we need to identify to get  ⌈
1 𝑎12
𝑎21 1
⌉ = 𝐴, and we need to impose restrictions on 𝐴, Therefore, the 
SVAR identification is about imposing restrictions on matrix 𝐴.In our case we will use the classic and 
most popular SVAR variant, which consists in an implementation of the Cholesky decomposition-based 
approach as offered by Gretl6. 
3.4. The data description 
For our study we will use mainly quarterly data. For most of the analysis and estimations we will use 
data from 2003-Q1 to 2016-Q3, by having in total a minimum of 55 observations. The main sources of 
dataare the WIIW7 for quarterly data, the IMF World Economic Outlook for yearly data and the World 
Bank Governance Indicators dataset for the data 8  on Controll of Curruption 9   and for Government 
Effectiveness10. For the countries that lack quarterly data in the early years we have used Litterman(1993) 
interpolation method to recreate quarterly data. All the data used in the regressions are seasonally adjusted 
using Tramo/Seats method. The econometric software(s) used for this work are Eviews and Gretl. The 
abbreviations such as Alb (Albania), Ks (Kosovo), BH (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Montenegro (Monte), 
Macedonia (Fyrom), Serbia (Sr), WB6 (6 Western Balkans countries) are used in the tables or figures. 
                                                          
5 In our case represented by the fiscal deficit. 
6 Econometric software 
7 The Vienna Institute for international Economic Studies 
8Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) 
9 Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
10 Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
4. Empirical results 
We have calculated the potential output for all the countries, according to all the methods mentioned 
in section 3.2, and we use them to estimate the output gaps as suggested by equation (4). Putting equation 
(4) results into equation (1), and estimating the regressions for each country we obtain the results of fiscal 
deficit cyclicality as seen in table 1. 
Table 1:    Fiscal Cyclicality coefficient estimations 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations (2017) 
Our results show that on average the fiscal policy of Albania, Kosovo and Serbia seem to be 
somehow counter-cyclical. The opposite is noticed for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro whose 
policy looks on average pro-cyclical. On the other hand Macedonia is the only one whose policy although 
looks pro-cyclical, has some tendency to be a-cyclical. The results are a bit contradictory for Albania, 
Kosovo and Serbia, where as seen from section 2, developing countries have mostly pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies. As expected for some of the countries, the filters used do not show similar results, and the 
choosing of only one filter for continuing the analysis it is done intuitively. In our case we have decided to 
use as a measure of the potential output the filter that shows the median results in terms of fiscal 
cyclicality, as highlighted in Table 111. 
In addition, estimating12 the equations (2) and (3), we are able to obtain the government quality 
impact on the deficit. From the results presented in table 2, we can see that economically both the proxy(s) 
used for government quality are economically significant, although not always statistically significant. 
                                                          
11  In the appendix, Figure 2 illustrates the output gaps gained from the estimations using only the 
highlighted filters for the respective countries. 
12 All the models estimated in table 2, are checked if they fulfill Gaus-Markov assumptions for the OLS 
method. We have checked for Heteroskedasticity (Breuch-Pagan test), Functional form (Reset test), 
Normality (Jacque-Bera test), Serial Correlation (this explains the AR(s) added into the regression. For 
Macedonia we have used robust least squares method as the tests indicated some issue of 
Baxter-King Butterworth Christiano-Fitzgerald Corbae-Ouliaris Hodrick-Prescott 
Albania 0.27 0.21 0.33 0.06 -0.18
Bosnia-Hercegovina -0.13 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 0.06
Kosovo 0.10 -0.18 0.11 0.13 -0.10
Macedonia 0.04 -0.52 0.00 0.12 -0.13
Montenegro -0.08 0.72 -0.06 -0.06 0.15
Serbia 0.41 -0.48 0.31 0.43 -0.45
Estimation period: 2003Q1 - 2016Q3
n = 55 for each country
Table 2:    Government quality effects on the fiscal balance 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations (2017) 
The positive sign in front of the coefficient for both variables for eg. Albania, show that the higher is the 
government effectiveness and the higher the control for corruption (so a reduction of it), the higher will be 
the government surplus, while for Serbia are shown opposite results where it seems that the government 
deficit increases in this case. The including of government quality indicators in the regressions seem to 
make the Albanian fiscal policy more counter-cyclical than in the initial estimations, the Serbian less 
counter-cyclical, the Macedonian more pro-cyclical, while the fiscal policy of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Macedonia remain on the same path without too much change. 
By estimating the SVAR from the equation (10), we are able to investigate further the effects of 
the cycle in the fiscal policy for the WB6 countries. We have included13 in the VAR 4 lags for Albania, 2 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2 for Macedonia, 1 for Kosovo, 2 for Montenegro and 6 for Serbia. In figure 1, 
we can see the impulses obtained from Cholesky decomposition-based approach, where we show14 the 
effects of the output gap on the fiscal deficit. The interpretation of figure 1, taking as an eg. Bosnia-
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Homoskedasticity. The Residuals mostly suffer from lack of normality, but this problem comes mainly 
because of some outliers in the data, and it can be skipped. 
13 For quarterly data, usually it is recommended using 4-8 lags, while in our case by watching the Inverse 
Roots graph and using the information criteria of Akaike and Schwarz we have come upon with this 
choice of lags. 
14 The vice-versa results are not included as they were not relevant for the current analysis. 
Herzegovina would be: When a positive shock in the output gap hits the Bosnian economy, with the 
output gap which increases, this will result with a positive effect in increasing the Bosnian fiscal surplus. 
The effect starts showing after 2-3 periods, and it reaches a top impact within 5 periods, starting to slow 
down after it, till it almost disappears around the 13th period. The opposite interpretation is valid when we 
take into consideration a negative shock in the output gap. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The impulse response from the output gap shock(s) 
Source: Author’s Calculations (2017) 
 
In the case of Albania the shock impact is a bit not clear, though it seems that on average, it looks that it 
increases temporarily the fiscal deficit, but this effects is reflected only after 1-2 periods, starting to 
disappear around the 6th period. In general we can see that for all countries there is a big impact of a 
structural shock in the output gap to the fiscal balance, suggesting that the business cycle really affects the 
deficit in the WB6 countries. These results are also confirmed by the Forecast Error Variance 
Decomposition15, which it shows better understanding of the relationship between the output gap and the 
fiscal balance. The Forecast Error Variance Decomposition shows to us the proportion of movements of a 
variable due to shocks to itself and to other variables. The forecast error variance of the fiscal balance for 
all the countries at longer horizons (till 20 periods) it is explained from the output gap shocks at a range 
from 10-16% of all the variance. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our main results show that on average fiscal policy in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia have counter-
cyclical behavior, graduating from the fiscal policy issue of pro-cyclicality, but contradicting Kaminsky et 
al. (2004) results for the developing countries. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia 
the results are not that satisfying, showing respectively pro-cyclical, pro-cyclical and a-cyclical behavior, 
by suggesting the need for fiscal policy changes in this countries toward counter-cyclical way. In 
investigating further the causes of fiscal cyclicality and relating it with government quality, we proved 
empirically that the fiscal policy approaches of the WB6, thought might not be strong enough to change 
fiscal policy direction they have amplifying effects. If WB6 countries fight more corruption and increase 
government effectiveness, their fiscal policy will be more effective. 
In general, if all the WB6 countries are hit by a structural shock in the output gap, the fiscal balance 
effect from the business cycle will be considerable and important. This finding is also confirmed by the 
forecast error variance of the fiscal balance for all the countries, where the output gap shocks explain on 
average almost 2% of the fiscal balance variance.  As result, better fiscal policy designing are needed in 
general for the Western Balkan countries in order for them to be able to copy with challenges arising from 
the business cycle, such as future possible crisis. A solution to better understanding fiscal cyclicality 
effects would be the using and calculation by the governments of the Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal balance 
as suggested by Frankel (2011)16. 
                                                          
15 See Figure 4 in the Appendix 
16 Figure 3 in the Appendix shows the Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Balance calculated for the WB6. 
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Figure 2: The output gaps of the chosen filters 
Source: Author’s Calculations (2017) 
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Figure 3: The cyclical balances of the chosen filters 
Source: Author’s Calculations (2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4: The forecast error variance decomposition 
Source: Author’s Calculations (2017) 
